We examine the influence of outside directors' industry experience on boards' advising and monitoring of diversified-firm managers. Given board composition is endogenous, we instrument for the presence of industry expert directors using the supply of experienced executives near conglomerate firms' headquarters. We find that industry expert representation on the board causes increased segment investment. Consistent with experienced directors, on balance, playing favorites rather than acting as dispassionate advisors, segment profitability (firm value) is lower for segments (firms) with industry expert outside directors. We do not find a corresponding negative profitability or valuation effect for single-segment firms.
Introduction
There is a large literature investigating the influence of outside directors' attributes on the effectiveness of the monitoring and advising functions performed by corporate boards of directors.
1 director experience and firm value extends to directors' experience in immediately up-and downstream industries, i.e., in supplier and customer industries. Taken together, these papers provide evidence consistent with the conclusion that there are positive net benefits to having outside directors with work experience related to firms' specific industries.
This study complements and extends the director experience literature by investigating the influence of outside directors' industry experience in the context of diversified firms. Specifically, we investigate the implications of conglomerate firms' appointing outside directors with experience in particular segments' industries, i.e., the degree to which conglomerates match outside directors' industry experience with the industry composition of the firms' segments. 3 Given investment policy plays a central role in the literature on corporate diversification, we initially consider the implications of director experience for conglomerate firms' investment policies. Stein (1997) demonstrates that if diversified firms' headquarters can, in the presence of capital constraints, re-allocate cash flows to divisions with better investment prospects, internal capital markets may be more efficient than external capital markets (the "bright side"). On the other hand, Scharfstein and Stein (2000) demonstrates that investment decisions in diversified firms may be overly driven by internal politics and rent seeking behavior by divisions, leading to less efficient allocations (the "dark side"). Given both are plausible, a natural question that arises is precisely which within-firm characteristics or mechanisms drive the tradeoffs in one direction vs. the other, e.g., see Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) . One conjecture is that outside directors with detailed industry knowledge dispassionately advise CEOs in determining the optimal levels of investment in the industries in which the directors have experience. Alternatively, directors with experience in one of a diversified firm's several industries may instead serve as biased "champions" for the divisions in which they have experience. If outside directors are biased in favor of allocating capital to familiar industries over unfamiliar industries, having industry expert board members would exacerbate the politics associated with internal capital allocations.
To investigate this issue, we assemble a comprehensive dataset of director work experience. Examining the effect of director experience on division-level investment is complicated by the endogeneity of board composition and investment policy and, hence, the possibility that causality may run in both directions between director experience and investment policy. Specifically, a director may influence the firm to invest more in the director's favored segment or, alternatively, firms may choose to appoint an experienced director prior to investing heavily in a segment for which the director has relevant experience. Thus, in all our tests, we use the supply of experienced executives near firms' headquarters as an instrumental variable for segments' representation on boards by experienced directors. Our approach utilizes the geographic distribution of executives across the United States and across time as a source of exogenous variation in board composition. This approach has been used in Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) , Field et al. (2013), Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) , Dass et al. (2013) , and Wang et al. (2016) . The identification strategy presumes that firms are likely to appoint directors from the local pool of executives. Given this presumption, we expect that firms whose headquarters are located in areas with a high relative supply of executives with experience related to a segment's industry will be more likely to appoint a director with experience in the segment's industry vis-à-vis firms located in areas with low or no supply of executives with related experience. As detailed below, this expectation is strongly supported in the data.
We take several steps to ensure that our instrument also satisfies the exclusion restriction in our tests, i.e., to ensure the local director supply measure does not also reflect the quality of a segment's investment opportunities. First, we exclude from the director supply measures any executives currently working in industries relevant to the segment industry. In other words, we measure the supply of experienced executives as only those who have obtained relevant experience at firms in industries other than the industry where they currently work. For example, executives working at technology firms (or their major supplier or customer industries) in Silicon Valley are excluded from the local director supply measure for similarly located tech segments ensuring that the measure does not reflect the vibrancy and quality of investment opportunities of the technology firms headquartered nearby. Second, we conduct our analysis on subsamples of diversified firms whose segments are unlikely to be located near headquarters, e.g., the noncore segments of conglomerates with highly geographically dispersed operations. Third, we include location-year fixed effects to control for time-varying, location specific economic conditions near firms' headquarters. Lastly, we also conduct our analysis on the sample of single-segment firms whose operations are much more likely to be located near headquarters. All else equal, differing results across the respective samples of diversified and single-segment firms would further indicate that our instrument is not simply proxying for local economic conditions because, if it were, then we would expect similar results for both samples.
We find that, for the segments of diversified firms, having industry expert representation on the board causes increased segment investment. Again, the positive association between the presence of industry expert directors and divisional investment is not in and of itself informative regarding valuation effects. Increased investment may represent board member favoritism and value destruction, or it may instead represent improved advising and value enhancement. Thus, we examine the link between instrumented director experience and segment-level profitability, as measured by return-on-assets ratios. Here, the evidence is consistent with experienced outside directors exacerbating the dark-side effects of diversification, rather than mitigating them. We also examine the effects of instrumented director experience on diversified firms' values relative to similarly constructed portfolios of focused firms. Here we find that diversified firms with more industry expert directors have substantially lower relative values to pure play firms than do diversified firms with less industry expert directors. Thus, the effect of segment industry expert directors appears to be negative on average for diversified firms. As a counterfactual check on this interpretation, we repeat our firm-level excess value analysis on samples of only pure-play firms. In short, we find a positive relation between instrumented director experience and relative value. Thus, it appears that the lack of inter-divisional politics in pure-play firms allows industry expert directors to play a more functional role in corporate governance, similar to the general findings in prior literature on director experience.
We also investigate whether CEO experience interacts with outside director experience in influencing segment investment, segment profitability, and firm excess value. Using survey data, Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015) present evidence that CEOs tend to delegate more on decisions in which they have less knowledge. A lack of knowledge about a particular segment's industry could increase a CEO's reliance on advice from outside directors with experience. Also, Xuan (2009) finds that newly appointed CEOs of diversified firms exhibit reverse favoritism by increasing resources allocated to divisions in which the CEOs did not previously work. Custodio and Metzger (2013) finds that firms making diversifying acquisitions negotiate better terms for targets in industries where their CEOs previously worked, i.e., industry expert CEOs capture a larger fraction of the surplus when bargaining with target management. Also, Ang, de Jong, and van der Poel (2014) and Huang (2014) find that firms are more likely to divest divisions operating in industries in which the CEO does not have prior work experience and that divestitures improving the match between CEOs' prior experience and segments' industries are met with more positive announcement abnormal returns and subsequent operating performance. 4 Thus, CEOs without experience in a segment's industry could exacerbate the effects of experienced directors' biases.
We find suggestive evidence that CEOs without experience in a segment's industry are not as effective as experienced CEOs in countering outside directors' bias toward the familiar in investment allocations.
Taken together, our findings are consistent with the presence of industry expert directors exacerbating the internal politics of diversified firms. In other words, such directors appear to act as industry champions rather than as impartial advisors on optimal investment policy.
Our paper contributes primarily to the literature examining outside director attributes on the efficacy of board monitoring and advising. Our focus on director industry experience and the inner workings of diversified firms is the largest distinction between our paper and the others in this literature. 5 Specifically, we investigate a unique junction of internal politics and corporate governance: the boards of diversified firms. Our findings indicate that outside directors in their roles as monitors and advisors exert influence over capital allocations within diversified firms.
While it is well established that CEOs and their delegates influence capital allocations, e.g., see Graham et al. (2015) , our results are novel in showing that outside directors' influence decision agents' choices in terms of segments' capital allocations. Our findings also further suggest that it is problematic to view outside directors as dispassionate arbiters of corporate policy, but that these 4 Landier, Nair, and Wulf (2009) use geographic proximity to headquarters rather than CEO experience as a proxy for a manager's familiarity with a division and document that divisions closer to headquarters are less likely to face layoffs or to be divested. 5 We also believe our approach to measuring director experience, described below, offers several methodological improvements over previous papers, in particular, more fully capturing relevant director experience.
board members should instead be viewed as important participants in the internal political process with their own specific preferences and biases. Ozbas and Scharfstein (2010) present evidence that managerial ownership is related to the severity of agency problems in diversified firms. Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, and Yermack (2012) analyzes the link between the "diversification discount" and various measures of corporate governance and concludes that poor governance is a significant determinant of the discount. Our results indicate that the industry experience of outside directors is a specific governance characteristic that also influences diversified firms' investment policies.
A possible explanation for the apparent negative average effects of director experience on conglomerates is that board members tend to be biased in favor of investments in the industries with which they have the most familiarity. and Moskowitz (1999) . However, it is not clear whether familiarity-driven investment is the result of investors making more informed decisions in familiar contexts, or whether behavioral biases (such as overconfidence and the availability heuristic) lead investors to favor assets they know more about, e.g., see Heath and Tversky (1991) . 8 Our results suggest that familiarity bias extends beyond investments in financial assets to corporate investments in real assets. We further provide evidence that such biases lead to inefficient investment and, consequently, lower firm values.
Our study also has potentially important implications in light of the recent proxy disclosure reforms enacted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Specifically, registrants must now "disclose for each director and any nominee for director the particular experience, qualifications, attributes or skills that qualified that person to serve as director … in light of the company's business." 9 At the margin, the requirement to justify appointments of directors will likely increase the incentives to select people with related industry experience as their prior experience is a defensible basis for their selection. However, our results suggest that increased incentives to add outside directors with related experience may come, all else equal, with a cost of 8 Some studies suggest that familiarity-driven investment may be efficient, reflecting investors capitalizing on their informational advantages. For instance Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find that individual investors generate higher returns on their local investments, and Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008) find that analysts make more precise estimates for geographically proximate firms. Other studies have suggested that familiarity-driven investment may be inefficient. Pool, Stoffman, Yonker (2012) find that, regardless of their current location, mutual fund managers are more likely to hold stocks that are located close to their hometown. Additionally, Keloharju, Knupfer, and Linnainmaa (2012) find that individuals are more likely to buy stock in the companies they frequent as customers. Both studies suggest that a bias for the familiar comes at the cost of bearing excess risk by holding less diversified portfolios. Inc. Ed Garden, the chief investment officer of Trian Fund Management L.P., states that directors with industry expertise "can help companies make good operating and strategic decisions." 10 However, we note that, at least anecdotally, activists appear to employ these strategies on focused firms as opposed to conglomerates. Their strategies at conglomerate targets are more often oriented towards forcing divestments of unrelated divisions. This paper proceeds as follows. We describe our sample construction, variables, and summary statistics in Section 2. We report results in Section 3 and offer a concluding discussion in Section 4.
Sample construction, variable definitions, and summary statistics

Segment Data
Our primary sample consists of the business or operating segments of diversified firms in the Compustat Historical Segment Files. Firms must have stock return data in CRSP and director data in BoardEx. We follow the diversification literature and exclude firms that have a financial segment (SIC 6000-6999) and firms with total sales less than $20 million. We combine all reported at least two different four-digit SIC industries. In addition, we eliminate firms where the deviation between firm sales (assets) and the sum of segment sales (assets) is greater than 1% (25%). Differences between the firm-level and segment-level totals for any accounting variables are allocated across segments proportionally.
Firms report segment-level data for assets, capital expenditures, sales, operating cash flow, and depreciation. All industry-level variables (such as Tobin's Q) are calculated using the assetweighted means of the standalone firms from the segment's industry.
11 Our primary measure of investment is the ratio of segment capital expenditures (CAPXS) to beginning period assets (IAS).
Segment-level capital expenditures are adjusted for industry by subtracting the average scaled capital expenditures of single-segment firms in the same industries (3-digit SIC code). Because segment reporting is inconsistent (i.e., segments can change their definitions each year at the firm's discretion), we follow Rajan et al. (2000) and calculate beginning period assets as end of period assets minus capital expenditures plus depreciation. Detailed definitions of all other variables can be found in the appendix. We report summary statistics for segment characteristics in Table 1 .
Measuring Director Experience
We utilize BoardEx to obtain annual director characteristics for 9,340 distinct companies over the 2000-2011 period. The BoardEx database allows us to identify each member of the board of directors for each firm-year as well as detailed information regarding directors' employment histories, essentially directors' resumes. However, while directors have unique identifiers, the companies they have worked for do not. There are over 300,000 unique company-name strings in the BoardEx resume file with many representing variants of the same business entity and varying across directors and years, e.g., "GE" and "General Electric." Further, beyond the company-name string, there is no additional information in BoardEx about the companies, e.g., SIC codes. Thus, we use a sequential name matching algorithm to match the company names in directors' BoardEx resumes to CRSP, Global Compustat, Dealscan, and SDC, to ascertain the industry affiliations of each company in directors' Boardex resumes. 12 We convert SIC industries to Input-Output (IO code) industries using the concordance table provided by the Benchmark Surveys of the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We do this in order to include executive experience gained in industries that are major suppliers to or customers of the segment's industry.
We define a director of segment j in year t as having relevant experience if at some point prior or concurrent to year t, she held an executive position at another firm in the same IO code as segment j or at a firm in a major customer or supplier industry. To identify major customer and supplier industries, we employ both the Make and Use Tables provided by the BEA to develop an industry by industry matrix of input and output utilization. We define an industry z to be a customer of industry y if z buys more than 5% of the output of industry y. Similarly, we define industry x to be a supplier to industry y if the amount that x sells to y is more than 5% of the output of industry y.
In most of our analysis, our measure of actual experience is an indicator variable equal to one if a segment is represented on the board by an outside director with related experience. As reported in Table 1 , approximately 52% of segment-years are cases in which a segment was represented by at least one outside board member with related prior executive experience.
Instrumental Variable for Director Experience
12 In the case of multiple database matches, we use the first available SIC code from the databases in the following priority structure: Compustat, CRSP, SDC, Dealscan.
Endogeneity of board composition and segment investment allocations limit the informativeness of any analysis using observed director experience. Thus, in all of our tests, we instrument for actual director experience using a measure of the relative local supply of experienced directors. Our approach utilizes the geographic distribution of executives across the United States and across time as a source of exogenous variation in board composition. Our identification strategy presumes that firms are likely to appoint directors from the local pool of executives, as in Knyazeva et al. (2013) , Field et al. (2013 ), Fahlenbrach et al. (2010 ), and Dass et al. (2013 . Given this presumption, we expect that firms whose headquarters are located in areas with a higher relative supply of executives with experience relevant to a segment's industry will be more likely to appoint a director with experience in the segment's industry. As detailed below, this expectation is strongly supported in the data.
We identify the geographical location of each executive (or director) in the BoardEx dataset throughout their employment history using the firms listed on their biographies. We use zip code data from Compustat, SDC, and Dealscan to identify the location where each executive worked at each point in time. If an executive had more than one position at a given time, we assume she lived in the location of the largest employer, or at the location of her only full-time position (e.g., the executive's secondary position was an outside directorship). If an executive had a gap in her employment, we assume she continued to live near her last known location. This approach allows us to characterize the locations of each executive, as well as their experience profile for each year.
For each firm-year, we define a firm's local director pool as the executives working in the 50 mile area surrounding the center of the zip code of the firm's headquarters, excluding the firm's own executives. We exclude from the local pool any executives that have not yet been a senior officer or director in their career in order to focus on only those executives that are likely to be in a public firm's director choice set. Thus, each firm has its own distinct local director pool each year. We measure the relative supply of experienced executives in the local director pool (Local Experience %) as the number of local executives with experience related to segment j's industry relative to the total number of executives in the local pool. Importantly, we exclude from a segment's supply measure calculation any executives currently working at firms in the segment's industry and any executives currently working at firms in major customer or supplier industries of the firm. Thus, only executives who gained relevant experience at prior positions and who are no longer working in these industries are counted towards the supply of experienced directors. These eliminations ensure that our director supply variable does not merely reflect current segment industry conditions, i.e., that our instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction. Without such exclusions, the local experienced director supply measure for a firm headquartered in Silicon Local experience % of 2/95. Note also that the calculation of Local Experience % for segment B, located in El Paso, is still based on director supply near the headquarters' location in Denver. It 13 We impose this constraint in order to ensure our IV satisfies the exclusion restriction, but, as discussed in section 3.4., our results are not sensitive to imposing this constraint.
would be difficult to argue that the makeup of the director pool in Denver is highly correlated to the local-specific investment opportunities for segment B in El Paso. This argument would be even harder to make the more geographically dispersed a firm's operations. As we discuss in detail in Section 4, we structure our analysis to further mitigate concerns that the Local Experience % variable is associated with potentially elevated investment opportunities related to local industry clustering. Some of this analysis involves sample restrictions related to geographic dispersion and core vs. non-core segments. In Panel B of Figure 1 , we illustrate how these sample restrictions would relate to our hypothetical diversified firms-it may be helpful to refer to this Panel when we discuss these sample restrictions below.
Panel A of figure 2 provides an initial indication of how access to a larger experienced director supply market near headquarters correlates with a segment's representation on the board by an experienced director. For the full sample of diversified firms' segments, a segment is nearly twice as likely to be represented on the board by an experienced independent director when their firm's headquarters is in the top quartile of local experienced director supply compared to segments of firms whose headquarters are in the bottom quartile. Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Masulis (2013) find that local director supply is less important for larger, more visible firms that have better access national director pools. Thus, in panel B of figure 2, we contrast the importance of local director supply in determining segments' representation on boards across segment asset size quartiles. As is evident from the panel, the positive relation between local experienced director supply and experienced board representation is larger for segments in the bottom three quartiles of segment size than for segments in the top quartile. 
Results
Director experience and segment investment
We report the results of instrumental variables regressions explaining segment-level, industry-adjusted investment in Table 2 While we construct our IV to specifically mitigate concerns that the total supply of experienced directors near headquarters reflects the quality of segment investment opportunities,
we also conduct our analysis on various subsamples of segments for which the supply of directors near firms' headquarters is unlikely to reflect segment investment opportunities. Panel B of Figure   1 illustrates the alternative subsampling criteria and their respective effects on the subsamples' compositions. Column 3 of Table 2 reports results when we restrict the analysis to segments of firms that are geographically dispersed. Similar to García and Norli (2012), we define a firm to be dispersed if its 10-k has more than 50% of state mentions reflecting states other than its headquarters state. This cutoff corresponds to approximately the top tercile of firms in terms of dispersion of operations outside their headquarters' states. 15 The coefficient on instrumented director experience is positive and both economically and statistically significant for this subsample.
Given headquarters are generally established very early in a firm's existence and do not often change locations, firms' headquarters are likely located near their primary operations. Thus, even our subsample of geographically dispersed firms may still include some firms whose primary operations are near headquarters and whose local supply of experienced directors somehow reflects local economic conditions. Thus, column 4 of Table 2 reports results for the subsample where each firm's largest segment (by sales) is excluded. Again, the relation between instrumented director experience and segment investment is positive and significant even for firms' noncore 15 We thank Diego García and Øyvind Norli for generously sharing their data on 10-k state mentions.
segments which are less likely to be located near headquarters.
Our third subsample approach is to combine the first two subsampling criteria and only include the noncore segments of geographically dispersed firms. This subsample contains only the segments that are highly unlikely to be located near headquarters. As reported in column 5 of Table 2 , the relation between instrumented director experience and segment investment is again positive and both economically and statistically significant. Taken together, these results suggest that our findings are not likely due to the instrument somehow failing to meet the exclusion restriction.
As an alternative to isolating segments unlikely to be located near headquarters, we also report results when we directly control for economic conditions around firms' headquarters. Our approach is to include U.S. Census MSA-year fixed effects. Results using this approach are reported in column 6 of Table 2 . Again, the coefficient on instrumented director experience is positive and significant suggesting that time-varying, economic conditions proximate to firms' headquarters do not explain the variation in focused-firm adjusted investment across segments with and without experienced director representatives on firms' boards.
In column 7 of Table 2 we include firm-year fixed effects to account for any time-varying unobservable heterogeneity at the firm level that could be driving the results. 16 Thus, these regressions can be interpreted as comparing a segment's focused-firm adjusted investment to that of the other segments in the same firm in a given year. Even after controlling for unobserved timevarying firm-specific factors and other standard controls, segments with experienced director representation invest significantly more than segments without such representation. The coefficient on instrumented director experience is somewhat larger in the presence of firm-year fixed effects, and the coefficient is economically important and highly statistically significant.
Taken together, these results are consistent with experienced director representation causing increased segment investment.
As an additional check, we examine the relation between instrumented director experience and industry adjusted investment for single-segment firms. If the positive relation between instrumented director experience and segment investment for diversified firms is somehow due to local director supply measures reflecting segment investment opportunities (and thereby violating the exclusion restriction), then we should observe a similar or perhaps even stronger positive relation between director experience and investment for single-segment firms which are considerably more likely to have operations located near headquarters. 17 Column 8 reports the results for the first stage regression of single-segments' director experience when year effects are included. Director experience is significantly higher (t = 17.29) for segments of firms located in areas with greater population densities of experienced directors, indicating that our instrument also meets the relevance criteria for these firms. Column 9 reports the second stage regression results.
In contrast to segments of diversified firms, instrumented experienced director representation is negatively and significantly related to focused firms' industry-adjusted segment investment. This strongly suggests that the positive relation for diversified firms is not simply due to the director experience instrument proxying for the attractiveness of segment investment opportunities.
Additionally, this finding suggests that, on balance, outside director experience plays a somewhat different role in determining segment investment levels in the absence of internal capital markets.
In particular, this finding is consistent with experienced directors at focused firms serving as an effective check on managerial incentives to overinvest relative to their focused-firm peers whose 17 In untabulated analysis, we confirm that segments of focused firms exhibit significantly lower mean and median state counts and higher mean and median home-state concentration ratios than the segments of diversified firms.
boards do not contain directors with relevant experience (perhaps because CEOs of firms without experienced directors prefer not to be monitored by experienced directors). Of course, as with the positive relation between investment and director experience for segments of diversified firms, the negative relation for single-segment firms could reflect better or worse outcomes, on average, for shareholders.
Segment Operating Performance
While the evidence above strongly supports the conclusion that diversified-firm segments with experienced director representation invest more relative to their industry rivals, it is not apparent from these results whether or not such investment patterns are more consistent with shareholder wealth creation or destruction. Thus, we examine the association between experienced director representation and segment profitability. Broadly speaking, if the greater investment in segments with director representation is value enhancing, then these segments should be more profitable, all else equal. report results for subsamples intended to further ensure that our instrument for director experience does not reflect local economic conditions. In all cases, we find a negative and statistically significant relation between director experience and segment profitability. Column 5 reports results with MSA-year fixed effects included. Again, there is a negative and significant relation between instrumented director experience and segment profitability. As reported in column 6, there is no statistically significant relation between director experience and profitability for the segments of focused firms.
Taken together, the results in Table 3 indicate that the higher investment levels of diversified-firms' segments with experienced director representation do not lead to substantially better operating performance for these segments. In fact, the results support the opposite conclusion, i.e., that experienced director representation is associated with inefficient overinvestment and, consequently, reduced segment profitability.
Board representation and diversified firms' excess values
While the operating performance analysis provides an indication of how the influence of experienced director representation on investment impacts segment profitability, we next turn our attention to whether correspondence between director experience and conglomerate firms' asset compositions is directly associated with relative firm values. As detailed in the appendix, we follow Berger and Ofek (1995) and Custodio (2014) and calculate excess values for diversified firms as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a diversified firm's actual value to its imputed value based on a similarly constructed portfolio of focused firms. overall firm values relative to a benchmark of pure-play firms, i.e., a dark-side to having outside directors with prior experience in segments' industries.
Given the literature investigating the effect of diversification on firm value often centers on agency considerations, e.g., see Denis et al. (1997) and Hoechle et al. (2012) , the specification in column 3 adds a number of governance-related control variables (coefficients omitted for brevity), i.e., Classified Board, Busy Board, Outside Director %, Log # Directors, and CEO Own %. The coefficient on instrumented director experience is negative and significant at the 1% level.
Thus, it appears that outside director experience is a distinct channel through which board composition leads to reductions in firm value among diversified firms.
In additional analysis, we further assess the relation between excess value and director experience. Column 4 of Table 5 reports a second stage regression where we confine the sample to industrially diversified firms whose operations are also geographically dispersed. The coefficient on instrumented director experience is negative and significant in this subsample.
Column 5 reports results for a specification including MSA-year fixed effects. Again, the coefficient on director experience is negative and significant. Thus, the negative relation between experienced director representation and firm value does not appear to be an artifact of our director experience instrument somehow proxying for time-varying economic conditions close to firms' headquarters locations.
Taken together, our findings thus far prompt a natural question. Why would experienced director representation cause increased segment investment, lower segment profitability, and reduced firm value? One explanation is that experienced directors in diversified firms have a bias toward the projects in segments with which they are most familiar. If experienced directors play favorites when allocating capital, i.e., favor low NPV investments in familiar industries over high NPV projects in unfamiliar industries, then the misallocation would result in overinvestment in familiar segments, lower profitability for familiar segments, and, ultimately, in lower overall firm values.
We would expect the negative effect of director experience to be mitigated in firms that operate in only one industry, i.e., in single-segment firms. Even if directors are biased toward familiar industries, single-segment experienced directors would not be forced to oppose any competing, high-NPV projects in unfamiliar industries in order to favor investments in their own industry. Because they would be choosing only among familiar investments, they could use a more efficient criterion for prioritizing capital investment projects. We test this hypothesis in the last two columns of Table 5 by examining excess value regressions for the subsample of singlesegment firms. The specifications are similar to those for diversified firms. As reported in column 6 of Table 5 , our instrument for director experience is highly significant (t=14.74) in the first stage regression. The relation between director experience and industry-adjusted value is positive and significant at the 10% level in the second stage regression in column 7. This implies that, in contrast to the results for diversified firms, greater director experience causes increased firm value for firms that operate in only one industry segment. The distinction in excess-value results across diversified vs. focused firms is consistent with greater outside director experience contributing to inefficient overinvestment and reduced firm value primarily in diversified firms where internal allocations of capital are more susceptible to misallocation as a result of director influence.
Robustness and Additional Results
While we take several steps to ensure our director supply measure does not also reflect the quality of a segment's investment opportunities, i.e., meets the exclusion restriction, we have also included a local industry cluster variable as a control variable in the regressions explaining investment and profitability. Local industry clusters are measured as the number of other segments in the same industry headquartered in the same locale as a given segment. This local industry cluster variable could proxy for local industry investment opportunities, technology or information spillovers, etc., e.g., see Almazan, De Motta, and Titman (2010) . All of the results reported in the paper are robust to including this variable as a control. We have also used the local industry cluster variable as a "placebo instrument" in place of our local director supply variable, e.g., see Guner et al. (2008) . If our local director supply variable (even when it excludes executives currently working in a segment's industry) is somehow proxying for local investment opportunities, then the local industry cluster variable results should replicate those using our local director supply variable. Local industry clusters fail to replicate the results. Finally, we also rerun our analysis when executives currently working in the same industry as a segment are not excluded from the local supply measure. The results are quite similar to those reported. Taken together, these additional tests provide further indication that our local director supply variable is not merely proxying for the quality of segments' investment opportunities.
We have also assessed robustness of reported results to several reasonable alternatives in variable construction and control variables inclusion. For instance, results using industry-adjusted operating income to sales are similar to those reported for industry-adjusted operating income to assets. Also, excess value results are similar if we use the segments' fractions of total assets as weights in calculating firm-level director experience. Finally, we have investigated whether the effects of director experience on segment investment are influenced by firm-level financial constraints. Financial constraints may mitigate overinvestment even when outside directors are biased in favor of overinvestment in industries with which they are familiar. We find no evidence that financial constraints affect the observed relations between director experience and segmentlevel investment and profitability or firm-level excess value.
We have investigated whether CEO experience interacts with outside director experience in influencing segment investment, segment profitability, and firm excess value. CEOs without experience in a segment's industry could further exacerbate the effects of experienced directors'
biases. While we cannot trace CEOs work histories within the segments of firms, we can determine if CEOs have previously worked in a segment's industry at another firm. We use these histories to code an indicator variable that takes a value of one if a CEO previously worked at another firm in a segment's industry. Interacting this variable with instrumented director experience yields generally insignificant results. When we run our specification on the subsample of segments for which CEOs appear inexperienced, we find that the influence of director experience is significant.
However, director experience is not significant in the subsample for which CEOs have outside experience in the segment's industry. These findings are suggestive that CEOs without outside experience in a segment's industry are not as effective as experienced CEOs in countering outside directors' bias toward the familiar in investment allocations.
Conclusion
This study examines the role of outside director industry experience in diversified firms.
Specifically, we investigate whether such industry expert directors help or hinder the political process of capital allocation in these firms. To do so, we utilize an instrumental variables approach based on the relative supply of experienced directors in the area around corporate headquarters.
We take several steps to ensure that our measure of local director supply meets the exclusion condition, i.e., does not proxy for the quality of segments' investment opportunities or local economic conditions affecting segment profitability and firm value. Our initial finding is that having industry expert representation on the board causes an increase in investment in the segments of diversified firms. Results of further analysis indicate that this increased investment is profit and value reducing. Thus, we conclude that industry expert directors, on balance, serve as biased "champions" of the industries in which they have expertise, in a manner parallel to the familiarity bias documented in the financial investments literature.
Our findings suggest that outside director work experience exacerbates the politics associated with internal capital market allocations at diversified firms and, thus, stand in sharp contrast to those of the existing literature which generally concludes there are positive net benefits to outside director experience. Our findings indicate that the benefits of director experience do not, on average, extend to diversified firms and that increasing experience on boards may not benefit shareholders if the biases of such directors are neglected. Our findings also suggest that the literature on diversification may well need to consider the role of actors beyond division managers and CEOs in the process of capital allocation in diversified firms.
Appendix: Variable Definitions Segment Level Variables
• CAPX/Assets is segment CAPX divided by the segment's total assets (Source: Compustat).
• CAPX/Assets (Focused-firm adjusted) is the focused-firm adjusted ratio of segment CAPX to segment assets. Industry adjustments are made using the asset-weighted mean of standalone firms in the same SIC3 industry if there are at least 5 firms available, else we use the SIC2 industry (Source: Compustat).
• Op. Income/Assets (Focused-firm adjusted) is the focused-firm adjusted ratio of segment operating income to segment assets. Industry adjustments are made using the assetweighted mean of standalone firms in the same SIC3 industry if there are at least 5 firms available, else we use the SIC2 industry (Source: Compustat).
• Any Experience Dummy is a dummy equal to one if the firm's board has at least one outside director with experience in an industry that is related (horizontal or vertical) to the segment's industry (source: Boardex).
• Industry Q is the asset-weighted mean of Tobin's Q for single segment firms in the same segment industry. The industry is defined at the SIC3 level if there are at least 5 firms in the industry, otherwise we use the SIC2 level. Tobin's Q=(ME + AT -BE)/AT. Where ME is market value of common equity using prices and shares outstanding from Compustat at Fiscal Year End, AT is total assets, and BE is book equity defined following Fama-French (1993) . Book equity is total shareholders' equity plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus the redemption value of preferred stock (Source: Compustat).
• Cash Flow/Assets is segment-level operating income plus depreciation, divided by the segment's total assets (Source: Compustat).
• Segment Size % is the segment's % contribution to total firm assets.
• Log Assets is the natural log of segment assets (Source: Compustat).
• Local Experience % is the fraction of local executives with experience related to segment j's industry to the total number of local executives. An executive is considered to be local if he works within 50 miles from the firm's headquarters (at another firm). An executive is considered to have experience if he has past executive experience at a firm in a horizontal or vertical industry. We exclude from a segment's supply measure calculation any executives currently working at firms in the segment's industry and any executives currently working at firms in major customer or supplier industries of the firm. Thus, only executives who gained relevant experience at prior positions and who no longer work in these industries are counted towards the supply of experienced directors.
Firm Level Variables
• Excess Value is the natural log of the ratio of the firm's market value of assets to its segment-level imputed value. We impute firm value by multiplying each segment's sales by the industry median market to sales ratio calculated for using only standalone firms. Industries are defined at the SIC3 level if at least 5 standalone firms have necessary data inputs, otherwise we use SIC2. We discard all firms that have any financial industry segments. Finally, we winsorize the variable at the 1% and 99% level (Source: Compustat).
• Segment Q Std. Deviation is the cross-sectional standard deviation of segment-level Tobin's Q for a particular multi-segment firm (Source: Compustat).
• Lag Log(assets) is the natural log of total firm assets at the beginning of the period(Source:
Compustat).
• Operating ROA is the firm-level ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (Source: Compustat).
• Firm Age is defined as the number of years the firm has reported to Compustat (Source:
• Idiosyncratic Risk is the root mean squared error from the CAPM factor model. The CAPM model is estimated using daily stock returns over the past fiscal year (Source: CRSP).
• CAPX to Assets is firm-level CAPX expense divided by the firm's total sales (Source:
• Leverage is defined as Long term debt + debt in current liabilities divided by total assets (Source: Compustat).
• Number of Segments is the number of operating or business segments reported by the firm at the 4-digit SIC level. If the firm reports multiple segments from the same 4-digit SIC level we combine them into one (Source: Compustat).
• Classified Board is a dummy variable equal to one if the board holds staggered elections (Source Riskmetrics/IRRC).
• Busy Board is a dummy variable equal to one if the majority of the board's outside directors hold 3 or more directorships (Source Riskmetrics/IRRC).
• Outside Director % is the fraction of non-executive board members (Source: BoardEx).
• Log # Directors is the natural log of total the number directors on the board (Source: Boardex).
• CEO Own % is the fraction of common shares owned by the CEO (Source: Execucomp). This figure illustrates the effects of a one standard deviation increase in the respective determinants of the probability a segment has a director with related experience on the board. Effects are computed from coefficients from column 1 of This table reports the estimates of two-stage least squares regressions explaining segment-level investment for segments of diversified firms (models 1-7) and single segment firms (models 8 and 9). The unit of observation is a segment-year. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 8 (first stage regressions) is Director Experience. The dependent variable is Focused-firm adjusted CAPX/Assets in models 2 -7 and 9 (second stage regressions). All variables are defined in the appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the segment level. T-statistics for the coefficient estimates are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample:
All diversified firms All other variables are defined in the appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics for the coefficient estimates are reported in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample: All diversified firms All diversified firms All diversified firms 
